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DE RUEHKH #2598/01 3051448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5105
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002598

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DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [UN](#) [CD](#) [ER](#)
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MTG WITH MINAWI: NCP IMPEDES PROGRESS
ON DARFUR AUTHORITY

Classified By: CDA E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, Senior Assistant to the President and leader of the SLM Minni Minawi described the efforts of the National Congress Party (NCP) to delay the implementation of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), foreign influence on other rebel movements, his attempts to negotiate with DPA non-signatories, and discord between the Arab militias and the Sudanese government. END SUMMARY.

NCP PROMOTING CHAOS

¶2. (C) During an October 14 meeting with Special Envoy Natsios, Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader Minni Minawi described the Sudanese government's efforts to weaken his leadership, avoid full implementation of the DPA, and maintain the status quo in Darfur. "The Government does not want to support or undermine the DPA," he said. Minawi continues to negotiate with the Sudanese government on the establishment of the TDRA but said his interlocutors want to delay full implementation of the agreement in order to foment chaos in Darfur and avoid a challenge to their authority. Later in the conversation, Minawi predicted that the Sudanese government would attempt to improve the security situation through its own military offensive in order to pre-empt UN intervention.

¶3. (C) Minawi stated that he had begun thinking about returning to Darfur to re-assert his control over the SLM but that the NCP opposed this and had warned him that it could not guarantee his safety. Minawi explained that the NCP is funding some members of his movement who oppose UN intervention to launch a coup against him but said he could guarantee his own security. He indicated that the NCP was trying to keep him in Khartoum in order to "break" him. "If you join the Government, they will divide you in two. If you're alone, they will also divide you in two."

¶4. (C) One of Minawi's assistants, Ali Trayo, said that the SLM's lack of resources weakened its position vis-a-vis the government and prevented it from influencing the NCP to implement the DPA. He also noted that many of the pro-Minawi commanders had not seen any dividends from the DPA, which made the environment conducive to a coup. "The NCP does not want to take us seriously because we don't have resources to stand on our own," said Trayo. By contrast, Minawi indicated that a coup was improbable and seemed uninterested in discussing details of how the USG could use its capital within the international community to provide assistance to the SLM. (NOTE: Ambassador Sam

Ibok, African Union head of DPA implementation, told AID Mission Director and Poloff on October 21 that he had attempted on numerous occasions to discuss with Minawi how the AU could facilitate non-military logistical support. However, he was unable to illicit a substantive response from Minawi. END NOTE)

FOREIGN INFLUENCE

15. (C) Minawi said that strident Chadian and Eritrean support for the National Redemption Front (NRF) was the principle factor in undermining the DPA. "I don't think there is anything called the National Redemption Front anymore--it's all Chad." He stated that 90-percent of the NRF forces engaged in the recent fighting near the northwest Darfur town of Tine were Chadian and that at least three or four NRF commanders want to dissolve the DPA and overthrow the Sudanese government. Trayo added that Chad had wanted to control the SLM but began to actively undermine it once this was not possible.

OUTREACH TO NON-SIGNATORIES

16. (C) Minawi said that he continues to encourage DPA non-signatory Abdul Wahid to join the agreement and that the SLM/Minawi vice chairman was scheduled to meet with Abdul Wahid in Asmara on October 15. "Abdul Wahid's actions--and some of his commanders--are positive right now," said Minawi. He said that compensation is the main outstanding issue, and that another non-signatory leader, Ahmed Abdul Shafie, could also be brought to the DPA in the

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near-term if this issue was addressed. Minawi said that he plans to absorb many of the dissident commanders into the upper echelons of the police, military and security forces through the TDRA in order to gain their accession to the DPA but that its structure might need to be expanded in order to accommodate them, which would require further negotiation with the Sudanese government. (NOTE: In an October 21 meeting with AID Mission Director and Poloff, Minawi said that he had spoken to Abdul Wahid for two hours earlier in the day and that his efforts to unify the two movements were gaining traction. END NOTE.)

JANJAWEEED-NCP DISCORD

17. (C) According to Minawi, Arab militia and tribal leader Moussa Hillal is frustrated with the Sudanese government and is distancing himself from it. "He says, 'the Government uses us in the South and in Darfur for a holy war and then makes agreements and leaves us,'" quoted Minawi. He said that the Arab militias were no longer "free roaming" but did cause conflict when they moved from one sector to another.

18. (U) Special Envoy Natsios cleared this message.
EWHITAKER